

# CONFIDENTIAL

## INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

25X1A

COUNTRY Iran

DATE DISTR. 8 SEP 50

SUBJECT Sabotage in Abadan and Khurramshahr

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NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

PLACE  
ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO.

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SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

1. On two different occasions during March 1950 holes were knocked in the lead pipes of the tanks in the cracking plant of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) refinery in Abadan, causing a temporary shutdown of the cracking plant until the damages could be repaired. [REDACTED] the Security Department of the AIOC investigated the case and discovered that the same work gang had been on duty both times that the sabotage occurred. Further investigation revealed that two members of this work gang were Tudeh members. These two men were discharged and the sabotage ceased.
2. On 8 June 1950 the pylon supporting the electric power line from Abadan to Khurramshahr was pulled down, resulting in the complete stoppage of electric current in Khurramshahr. The damage was repaired after a day, but the saboteurs were never discovered.
3. On 15 July 1950 the same pylon again was pulled down and Khurramshahr was without electricity until the damage was repaired; no culprit could be discovered.
4. [REDACTED] that the damage from these four sabotage acts had more of a nuisance value rather than caused a serious upsetting of the output of the refineries or the operations of the Khurramshahr port.
5. [REDACTED] there are no definite suspects for the last two sabotage efforts. On the subject of sabotage, [REDACTED] Soviet sabotage organization was formed in 1947 in Beirut, Lebanon, to disrupt the Middle and Near East oil companies in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Two Tudeh members, Dashtipur and Muradi,\* received training in this organization and at present are living in Abadan, where they are under police surveillance.
6. [REDACTED] it is practically impossible to protect the AIOC refineries in Abadan against well-planned and carefully executed sabotage, for the following reasons:

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- a. The size of the area covered by the refineries, which is too huge adequately to police.
- b. The susceptibility of the Iranian watchmen to bribery or threat of force.
- c. The extreme vulnerability of an oil refinery and of oil tanks to sabotage, especially by fire.

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Comment. [REDACTED] for additional information regarding these two individuals.

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